Dynamic fidelity — distributed update authority + auditability as credible commitment
The idea
Alston's coinage: when authority to change a protocol is mechanically distributed among independent actor classes (validators, developers, users, complementors), protocol-level commitments become credibly entrenched — emergent checks and balances analogous to constitutional separation of powers (pp. 1, 12–14). The mechanism is North & Weingast's Glorious Revolution logic: credibility rests on architectural separation, not good intentions; centralized-platform users remain "pre-Glorious Revolution lenders" (p. 13). Auditability reinforces it: publicly legible rules plus an auditable application history let participants detect deviations, while entrenchment prevents deviations being imposed — jointly collapsing Ostrom's monitoring costs (pp. 17–18). Contrast class: procedural constraint (platform policies, appeals) inside centralized discretion, suited to context-specific rule application; architectural constraint suits credible commitment (pp. 5–6). For expressive/associative protocols, only a narrow core needs entrenchment — "permissionless access, pseudonymous participation, and non-discretionary execution" — with flexibility elsewhere (p. 20). Costs: entrenchment protects unjust rules equally, and de facto power can relocate to adjacent microstructure layers even when core rules stay distributed (pp. 15–17).
The Nostr case
Nostr fits the expressive-protocol specification almost exactly: the entrenched core is the identity/portability layer (keys, signatures, event formats — hence no global bannability), while the relay-policy layer is maximally flexible and discretionary (procedural constraint, relay by relay). But Nostr lacks Alston's entrenchment engine — no consensus mechanism, no staked validators. What entrenches the core is implementation plurality: many independent clients and relays plus the NIP process, i.e. his complementor-veto logic without validators. Whether that is durable is open ({{ref:q-generativity-robustness|Q: Is robustness generativity rather than redundancy?}}); and his microstructure caveat transfers as concentration in big relays, default clients, and discovery services.
Sources
- {{ref:src-digital-constitutionalism|Alston (working paper)}} (pp. 1, 5–6, 12–18, 20) - North & Weingast 1989; Hart 1961 secondary rules; Tsebelis veto players — via Alston's citations, not read directly.
Related: - {{ref:emergentgov|Index}} - {{ref:concept-gkc-framework|The GKC research framework (knowledge commons as modified IAD)}} - {{ref:concept-polycentricity|Polycentricity}} - {{ref:concept-rule-levels|Levels of rules}} - {{ref:concept-exit-voice|Exit, voice, and forking}} - {{ref:concept-governance-as-software|Governance as software}} - {{ref:concept-adaptive-governance|Adaptive governance as feedback architecture}} - {{ref:claim-no-global-bannability|No global bannability}} - {{ref:claim-formation-observable|Formation is observable for the first time}} - {{ref:claim-split-sanctions|Split sanctions}} - {{ref:claim-worst-case-hosts-best-case|The worst case hosts the best case}} - {{ref:q-maturation-hypothesis|Q: The maturation hypothesis (flagged conjecture)}} - {{ref:q-does-competition-improve-governance|Q: Does interjurisdictional competition yield better governance?}}